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Abstract 
Researchers often employ implicit measures as dependent variables to investigate processes of 
attitude formation and change. In such studies, experimentally induced differences are typically 
interpreted as reflecting change in automatic evaluations. We argue that experimentally induced 
effects on implicit measures may not always reflect genuine changes in evaluative responses, but 
can be driven by the mechanisms underlying the measurement procedure. In line with this 
assumption, the present research shows that these mechanisms can produce opposite effects of 
the same experimental manipulation for otherwise equivalent implicit measures. These results 
indicate that merely observing experimental effects on implicit measures does not allow direct 
inferences regarding changes in automatic evaluations. Instead, psychological interpretations of 
such effects hinge upon the mechanics of how a given measurement procedure responds to 
variations in the context. Implications for research using implicit measures are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Affect Misattribution; Affective Priming; Automatic Evaluation; Implicit Measures; 
Response Interference 
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When the Method Makes a Difference: Antagonistic Effects on “Automatic Evaluations” as a 
Function of Task Characteristics of the Measure 
 
Experimental procedures to measure automatic evaluations or immediate affective 
responses gained immense interest during the last 10 years, and are currently used as standard 
tools in a variety of research areas (for reviews, see Fazio & Olson, 2003; Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, 
in press; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). The core feature of these measures is that they provide 
an index of people’s propensity to respond favorably or unfavorably to a given stimulus without 
requiring an explicit evaluation of that stimulus. More precisely, such “implicit” measures allow 
one to infer evaluations from response latencies or error rates, typically in speeded categorization 
tasks. The most prominent examples of these measures are Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz’s 
(1998) Implicit Association Test (IAT) and Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and Williams’ (1995) Bona 
Fide Pipeline (BFP).1 Other examples include Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart’s (2005) 
Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), De Houwer’s (2003a) Extrinsic Affective Simon Task 
(EAST), and Nosek and Banaji’s (2001) Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT).  
Based on evidence that automatic evaluations assessed by these measures reliably predict 
judgments and behavior (for a review, see Fazio & Olson, 2003), researchers became 
increasingly interested in questions pertaining to their origin and change (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007; Rudman, 2004; Wilson, Lindsey, & 
Schooler, 2000). For instance, with regard to their origin, researchers have explored the roles of 
evaluative conditioning (e.g., Olson, & Fazio, 2001), cognitive balance (e.g., Gawronski, 
Walther & Blank, 2005a), and ingroup favoritism (e.g., Otten & Wentura, 1999). Moreover, 
research addressing change in automatic evaluations has investigated various mechanisms, 
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including cognitive dissonance (e.g., Gawronski & Strack, 2004), attitude-related education 
programs (e.g., Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001), and extended training in negating evaluative 
responses (e.g., Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008a; Kawakami, Dovidio, 
Moll, & Hermsen, 2000). Taken together, these results suggest that (a) automatic evaluations 
may be more malleable than suggested by some models (cf. Wilson et al., 2000), and (b) the 
mechanisms underlying their formation and change may differ, at least partially, from the ones 
previously obtained for self-reported explicit evaluations (for a review, see Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006). 
In the present article, we suggest that researchers should be cautious in interpreting 
experimentally induced effects on implicit measures as direct evidence for changes in automatic 
evaluations. In line with earlier warnings (e.g., Eder, Hommel, & De Houwer, 2007; Fazio & 
Olson, 2003; Klauer & Musch 2003; von Hippel, 2004), we argue that performance on indirect 
measurement procedures does not provide direct reflections of the evaluations they are designed 
to assess. Instead, evaluations influence task performance only indirectly by means of further 
psychological processes that mediate the link between the two (Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 
2001; Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005; De Houwer, 2003b; Klauer & 
Musch, 2003; Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). To be sure, the operation of task-specific 
mediators does not necessarily challenge the validity or usefulness of implicit measures in 
predicting judgments and behavior. It does, however, imply a more complex picture of the 
apparent flexibility that has previously been observed with implicit measures. Specifically, we 
argue that experimental manipulations may not only influence automatic evaluations proper, but 
also the task-specific processes that mediate between evaluation and task performance (see 
Figure 1). Thus, experimental effects on implicit measures can be due to either (a) a genuine 
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change in the underlying evaluative response (see Figure 1, Path A), or (b) a secondary change in 
the task-specific mediator (see Figure 1, Path B). More seriously, if a given manipulation 
influences task-specific mediators rather than underlying evaluations, the same experimental 
manipulation can lead to different outcomes for different kinds of measurement procedures. 
Needless to say, such experimental effects on task-specific mediators have the potential to distort 
any theorizing about automatic evaluations, if these effects are mistakenly interpreted as 
reflecting genuine changes in automatic evaluations. In the present studies, we provide evidence 
showing that different task-specific mediators can even lead to opposite effects resulting from 
the same experimental manipulation, pointing to the significance of these issues if the role of 
task-specific mediators is neglected. 
Variants of Affective Priming 
Even though our claims are applicable to any kind of implicit measure, the present research 
is particularly concerned with two variants of affective priming, namely Fazio et al.’s (1995) 
BFP and Payne et al.’s (2005) AMP. In general, affective priming tasks are based on the notion 
that the processing of a target stimulus is influenced by the valence of a prime stimulus that is 
briefly presented before the target. Depending on the particular paradigm, affective priming 
mainly occurs in the form of compatibility or assimilation effects (for a review, see Klauer & 
Musch, 2003). Important to the present discussion, such priming effects can be mediated by 
different task-specific mechanisms, which have their roots in procedural details of the respective 
measures. 
Bona Fide Pipeline  
The most prominent affective priming paradigm is Fazio et al.’s (1995) BFP. In this task, 
participants are asked to make speeded evaluative decisions about positive and negative target 
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words, which are preceded by positive or negative prime stimuli. Affective priming effects in 
this paradigm are reflected in compatibility effects, such that prime-target pairs of matching 
valence result in faster and more accurate target-evaluations than non-matching pairs (for 
reviews, see Fazio, 2001; Klauer & Musch, 2003). Originally, researchers assumed that affective 
priming effects in the BFP resemble the non-affective spread of activation in associative 
networks (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 
1994; see Collins & Loftus, 1975). That is, initial stimulus evaluations were thought to result in 
an increased activation of evaluatively congruent material in memory, which in turn was 
assumed to facilitate the encoding of evaluatively congruent targets and to interfere with the 
encoding of evaluatively incongruent targets. Available evidence supports the operation of this 
encoding-related mediator in the BFP, though its actual influence turned out to be minor 
compared to other mechanisms (Klauer, Musch, & Eder, 2005).  
Over the past decade, an accumulating body of research provided evidence that response-
interference (RI) rather than spreading activation may be the dominant mediator of priming 
effects in the BFP (e.g., De Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002; Gawronski, 
Deutsch, & Seidel, 2005b; Klauer & Musch, 2002; Klauer, Roßnagel, & Musch, 1997; Klauer & 
Teige-Mocigemba, 2007; Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000; Wentura, 1999). To illustrate the RI 
mechanism, assume that a participant was instructed to respond with a right (left) hand key-press 
to positive (negative) target words. According to the RI account, the short-term associations 
implied by these instructions are sufficient for both primes and targets to trigger the respective 
response tendencies (De Houwer, 2003b). That is, both positive primes and positive targets 
trigger a response tendency to press the right key, whereas both negative primes and negative 
targets trigger a response tendency to press the left key. Thus, if primes and targets are of 
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different valence, the two stimuli trigger two different response tendencies, thereby interfering 
with quick and accurate responses to the target. In contrast, if primes and targets share the same 
valence, the two stimuli elicit the same response tendency, thereby facilitating quick and 
accurate responses to the target.  
Affect Misattribution Procedure  
Payne et al. (2005) recently introduced an affective priming variant, the AMP, which 
resembles the BFP on the surface, but substantially differs in methodological details and 
therefore in its task-specific mediator. In this paradigm, participants are briefly presented with a 
positive or a negative prime stimulus, which is followed by a neutral Chinese character (see also 
Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). After a brief interval, the Chinese character is replaced by a masking 
stimulus, and participants are asked to indicate whether they consider the Chinese character as 
more or less pleasant than average. Affective priming in this paradigm is reflected in assimilation 
effects, such that the neutral Chinese ideographs are evaluated more positively (negatively) when 
they were preceded by a positive (negative) prime stimulus (Payne et al., 2005). The AMP 
procedure differs from the BFP in several ways, the most important differences being that the 
targets in the AMP are of neutral valence, semantically meaningless for participants, presented 
very briefly, and are replaced by a masking stimulus. In the BFP, on the other hand, the targets 
are of clear semantic meaning and valence, and typically remain on the screen until participants 
responded.  
To account for priming effects in the AMP, Payne et al. (2005) suggested a misattribution 
mechanism whereby the affect elicited by the prime is (mistakenly) used to evaluate the Chinese 
character. Such misattribution processes are likely facilitated by several features of the task, such 
as the lack of a clear evaluative or semantic meaning of the target stimuli, their brief and single 
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presentations, as well as their replacement by a masking stimulus. Importantly, these 
characteristics also eliminate RI as a potential mechanism in the AMP. Given that the target 
stimuli in the AMP lack a clear evaluative and semantic meaning, they are unlikely to trigger the 
same kind of response tendencies as the target words in the BFP. As such, there are no response 
tendencies elicited by the targets that could be congruent or incongruent with the response 
tendencies elicited by the primes, thereby undermining the occurrence of RI. Instead, it seems 
likely that the affect elicited by the prime prolongs during the presentation of the Chinese 
character, thereby biasing participants’ evaluations of the target. Thus, as Payne et al. (2005) 
argued, participants seem to mistakenly assume that their affective reaction stems from the target 
character, which may result from their inability to disentangle the relative contributions of prime-
related versus target-related responses to their momentary affective state (Wilson & Brekke, 
1994).  
Despite these differences in task-specific mediators, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
BFP and the AMP still tap the same automatic evaluations. This assumption is supported by 
research showing corresponding effects for the two measures, such as for example their shared 
moderation by motivational variables in the prediction of self-reported evaluations (e.g., Fazio et 
al., 1995; Payne et al., 2005). At the same time, the aforementioned procedural differences may 
make them differentially susceptible to the same experimental manipulation, if this manipulation 
influences their task-specific mediators (see Figure 1).  
Construct-Related vs. Method-Related Variations 
Separating method-specific and construct-specific effects is certainly not an easy task. A 
useful example to illustrate this difficulty is a recent study by Gawronski et al. (2005b). Their 
experiments examined variations in automatic evaluations of positive and negative stimuli when 
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these stimuli are encountered in the context of a positive or negative stimulus. Employing the 
basic structure of the BFP, participants were first presented with a context stimulus of either 
positive or negative valence, which was replaced by a positive or negative prime stimulus 
(Balota & Paul, 1996). This sequence was followed by the presentation of a positive or negative 
target word, which had to be classified in terms of its valence. Results indicated that affective 
priming effects of a given prime stimulus were more pronounced when this stimulus was 
preceded by a context stimulus of the opposite valence than when it was preceded by a context 
stimulus of the same valence. In other words, positive prime stimuli facilitated positive responses 
to a greater extent when they appeared in a negative rather than a positive context. Likewise, 
negative prime stimuli facilitated negative responses to a greater extent when they appeared in a 
positive rather than a negative context.  
At first glance, one may conclude that these contrast effects reveal a general principle of 
automatic evaluations. In line with the principle of hedonic contrast (Brickman, Coates, & 
Janoff-Bulman, 1978), one could argue that affective reactions to a given stimulus are generally 
enhanced in a context of the opposite valence, whereas affective reactions tend to be reduced in a 
context of the same valence. On the other hand, the observed contrast effects could also be 
explained by the operation of RI mechanisms in the BFP. Drawing on earlier research showing 
visual contrast effects in attention (see Cacioppo, Crites, Berntson, & Coles, 1993; Gawronski, 
Deutsch, & Strack, 2005c), Gawronski et al. (2005b) argued that context stimuli of the opposite 
valence increase the salience of the valence of the subsequent prime, whereas the salience of 
prime valence should be reduced by context stimuli of the same valence. Such attentional effects 
seem particularly important in the BFP, given previous evidence showing that priming effects in 
this task depend on participants’ attention to the primes (e.g., Musch & Klauer, 2001; Simmons 
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& Prentice, 2006; Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007; see also Proctor & Cho, 2006). 
In terms of the RI account, one could argue that increased salience of prime valence increases the 
activation of a pre-potent response tendency elicited by the prime, thereby enhancing the size of 
RI effects (Gawronski, Deutsch, & LeBel, & Peters, in press). Importantly, to the degree that 
evaluative features of an object may influence automatic evaluations even when perceivers do 
not pay attention to those features (e.g., Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004), the RI 
mechanism underlying the BFP may sometimes produce attention-related variations in 
measurement scores that do not reflect genuine variations in automatic evaluations. At the same 
time, it is also possible that attention to evaluative attributes of an object modulates automatic 
evaluations of that object (Fazio, 2007). In this case, the attentional mechanism proposed by 
Gawronski et al. (2005b) may actually produce genuine variations in automatic evaluations, 
rather than spurious variations resulting from the task-specific mediator. Based on these 
considerations, contextual contrast effects on BFP scores may reflect either construct-related 
effects on automatic evaluations or method-related effects on the task-specific mediator (see 
Figure 1).  
The Present Research 
To test the potential involvement of method-specific processes in experimentally induced 
effects on affective priming, the present research employed two strategies. First, we compared 
experimental effects on two affective priming paradigms: one that is based on RI (BFP) and one 
that is based on misattribution (AMP). To the degree that our manipulation differentially 
influences the task-specific mediators underlying these measures, we expected substantial 
differences in their outcomes even when the two measures were identical with regard to the 
employed stimuli and presentation times. For this purpose, Experiments 1 and 2 compared 
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affective priming effects resulting from two sequentially presented prime stimuli in Fazio et al.’s 
(1995) BFP (Experiment 1) and Payne et al.’s (2005) AMP (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, we 
aimed at replicating the contextual contrast effects observed by Gawronski et al. (2005b), which 
served as a standard of comparison for Experiment 2. If contextual contrast effects in the BFP 
are driven by genuine changes in automatic evaluations, these changes should occur irrespective 
of whether the employed measure does (BFP; Experiment 1) or does not (AMP; Experiment 2) 
involve an RI component. If, however, the obtained contrast effects were driven by the impact of 
differential salience of prime valence on RI effects, evaluative context primes should lead to 
contrast effects only in tasks that do involve an RI component (BFP; Experiment 1), but not in 
tasks that do not involve an RI component (AMP; Experiment 2). To the contrary, given that the 
misattribution mechanism of the AMP has been shown to integrate independent sources of affect 
(Murphy, Monahan, & Zajonc, 1995), the AMP may show additive rather than contrast effects of 
evaluative context stimuli. Such additive effects would be in direct opposition to the contrast 
effects in the BFP.  
The second strategy employed in the present research was to test whether the observed 
effects are limited to measures of evaluative responses. Based on the dissociation predicted for 
Experiments 1 and 2, one could still object that the contrast effect in the BFP is a genuine 
characteristic of automatic evaluations that cannot be captured by the misattribution mechanism 
of the AMP. To rule out this concern, we aimed at replicating the obtained dissociation for non-
evaluative, semantic variants of the two paradigms. Given that semantic priming should follow 
principles of spreading activation rather than hedonic contrast (e.g., Balota & Paul, 1996; see 
Collins & Loftus, 1975), the contrast effects obtained for the evaluative variant of the BFP 
should turn into additive effects for the non-evaluative, semantic variant of the BFP, if these 
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contrast effects reflect a genuine characteristic of automatic evaluation. If, however, the obtained 
contrast effects are caused by method-specific rather than construct-related factors, they should 
also occur if the same measurement procedure is used to assess non-evaluative responses (Eder 
et al., 2007). For this purpose, Experiments 3 and 4 employed non-evaluative variants of Fazio et 
al.’s (1995) BFP and Payne et al.’s (2005) AMP using the same general set-up and timing as in 
the first two experiments. However, deviating from the measures employed in Experiments 1 and 
2, the two tasks were designed to measure the activation of the semantic categories animate 
versus inanimate. In Experiment 3, participants completed a variant of the BFP involving 
animate or inanimate context stimuli, which were followed by either animate or inanimate prime 
stimuli. The prime stimuli were then replaced by animate or inanimate target words, and 
participants’ task was to indicate as quickly as possible whether the target word depicts an 
animate or an inanimate object (non-evaluative RI task). In Experiment 4, participants were 
primed with the same stimuli used in Experiment 3, but were presented with neutral Chinese 
characters as target stimuli. Participants’ task was to guess whether the Chinese character refers 
to an animate or an inanimate object (non-evaluative judgment). If the contrast effects obtained 
for the BFP are indeed driven by method-related rather than construct-related factors, the non-
evaluative paradigms employed in Experiments 3 and 4 should reveal the same paradigm-related 
dissociation, even when the response dimension is non-evaluative rather than evaluative. Such a 
finding would provide further evidence for our assumption that method-specific psychological 
processes can be responsible for experimentally induced effects on implicit measures. 
To isolate the effects of measurement paradigm (BFP vs. AMP) and type of response 
(evaluative vs. non-evaluative), identical context and prime stimuli were used across the four 
experiments. Hence, although Experiments 1 and 2 were primarily concerned with affective 
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priming effects, the stimulus materials also varied in terms of the non-evaluative dimension 
employed in Experiments 3 and 4 (i.e., animate vs. inanimate). Likewise, although Experiments 
3 and 4 were primarily concerned with non-evaluative priming effects, the stimulus materials 
also varied in terms of valence (i.e., positive vs. negative).  
Experiment 1 
The primary goal of Experiment 1 was to demonstrate contextual contrast effects 
resulting from two sequentially presented prime stimuli in an implicit measure that does contain 
a RI component, namely Fazio et al.’s (1995) BFP. Participants were presented with positive or 
negative target words, which were preceded by context and prime stimuli varying in terms of 
valence. Participants’ task was to indicate as quickly as possible whether the target word depicts 
a positive or a negative object. Based on earlier findings by Gawronski et al. (2005b), we 
expected the priming effects of positive and negative primes to be more pronounced when they 
appeared in an evaluatively incongruent context than when they were presented in an 
evaluatively congruent context. 
Method 
 Participants and design. Fifty-four undergraduates at the University of Western Ontario 
(40 female, 14 male) participated in Experiment 1. All subjects received course credit for their 
participation. The experiment represented a 2 (First Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 
(First Prime Category: animate vs. inanimate) × 2 (Second Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) 
× 2 (Second Prime Category: animate vs. inanimate) × 2 (Target Valence: positive vs. negative) 
× 2 (Target Category: animate vs. inanimate) within-subjects design.  
Materials. We used 15 words of each positive animate objects, negative animate objects, 
positive inanimate objects, and negative inanimate objects, which were selected via pre-tests (see 
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Appendix). Each set of words was divided into three subsets, resulting in three sets of five 
stimuli for each of the four stimulus categories. The three subsets were used as first primes, 
second primes, and target stimuli in the BFP. The particular position of the subsets (i.e., first 
prime, second prime, target) was counterbalanced across the experimental conditions. 
Procedure. The priming tasks consisted of 128 trials, including two trials for each of the 64 
possible combinations of first prime, second prime, and target implied by the aforementioned 
experimental manipulations. Each trial began with the presentation of a blank screen for 700 ms, 
followed by a fixation cross (+) for 700 ms. The fixation cross was then replaced by the first 
prime for 133 ms, which was followed by the second prime for 133 ms. The second prime was 
then replaced by a blank screen for 34 ms, followed by the target word. Participants were asked 
to indicate as quickly as possible whether the target word depicts a positive or negative object 
(evaluative decision task) using a right-hand key (5 of the number pad) to indicate a positive 
response, and a left-hand key (A) for a negative response. They were also instructed to try not to 
be distracted by the primes. 
Results 
Before we tested our hypotheses, we discarded all latencies stemming from anticipations 
(RT < 300 ms; 0.2%) and incorrect responses (5.5%). Following recommendations by Ratcliff 
(1993), all of the subsequent analyses were conducted twice: once with a predetermined cutoff-
value (in this case 1000 ms) and once with inverse-transformed latencies. The two data sets 
revealed corresponding patterns of results. For ease of interpretation, we report data with a cutoff 
of 1000 ms.2 
To test the influence of evaluative context stimuli in the BFP, we first recoded the 
manipulation of first prime valence to reflect its evaluative (in)consistency with the valence of 
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the second prime (see Gawronski et al., 2005b). Response latencies were then submitted to a 2 
(Second Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (First Prime Valence: consistent vs. 
inconsistent with second prime valence) × 2 (Target Valence: positive vs. negative) ANOVA for 
repeated measures (see Table 1). This analysis revealed a significant main effect of target 
valence, F(1, 52) = 14.00, p < .001, η2 = .212, indicating that responses to positive target words 
(M = 616.00, SE = 6.99) were generally faster than responses to negative target words (M = 
633.52, SE = 6.47). This main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between 
second prime valence and target valence, F(1, 52) = 10.91, p = .002, η2 = .173, reflecting the 
standard affective priming effect. Specifically, participants were faster in responding to positive 
targets when the second prime was positive (M = 610.70, SE = 7.68) than when it was negative 
(M = 621.27, SE = 7.39). In contrast, participants were faster in responding to negative targets 
when the second prime was negative (M = 627.21, SE = 7.21) than when it was positive (M = 
639.82, SE = 6.46). More important to the present question, this two-way interaction was further 
qualified by a significant three-way interaction between first prime valence, second prime 
valence, and target valence, F(1, 52) = 6.46, p = .01, η2 = .110. To specify this interaction in 
terms of the present hypotheses, we conducted separate 2 (Second Prime Valence) × 2 (Target 
Valence) ANOVAs for the two context conditions.  
For evaluatively inconsistent context primes, analyses revealed a significant main effect 
of target valence, F(1, 52) = 8.29, p = .006, η2 = .138, indicating that responses to positive target 
words (M = 617.45, SE = 7.47) were faster than responses to negative target words (M = 633.49, 
SE = 6.55). More important, the analysis revealed a significant two-way interaction reflecting the 
standard affective priming effect, F(1, 52) = 16.15 p < .001, η2 = .237. Specifically, participants 
tended to be faster in responding to positive targets when the second prime was positive than 
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when it was negative, F(1, 52) = 4.13, p = .047, η2 = .074. In contrast, participants were 
significantly faster in responding to negative targets when the second prime was negative than 
when it was positive, F(1, 52) = 14.51, p < .001, η2 = .218. The same analysis for evaluatively 
consistent context primes only revealed a significant main effect of target valence, F(1, 52) = 
10.83, p = .002, η2 = .173, indicating that responses to positive target words (M = 614.52, SE = 
7.48) were faster than responses to negative target words (M = 633.54, SE = 6.91). The two-way 
interaction that would indicate the standard affective priming effect was far from statistical 
significance, F(1, 52) = 0.87, p = .36, η2 = .016. 
To facilitate subsequent comparisons with AMP scores in Experiment 2, we also computed 
a priming-index, reflecting the relative advantage of positive over negative responses given a 
particular prime set (sometimes interpreted as an index of automatic positivity). This index was 
calculated by subtracting the latencies of responses to positive targets from the latencies of 
responses to negative targets given a particular combination of first and second prime (e.g., 
Gawronski et al., 2005b).3 Mean values of the priming index are depicted in Figure 2. Post-hoc 
comparisons revealed a statistically significant effect of second prime valence in evaluatively 
inconsistent contexts, F(1, 52) = 16.15, p < .001, η2 = .237, such that positive second primes 
resulted in a stronger advantage of positive responses compared to negative second primes. This 
contrast is statistically equivalent to the two-way interaction of second prime valence and target 
valence with inconsistent first primes (see above). In evaluatively consistent contexts, however, 
the main effect of second prime valence failed to reach significance, F(1, 52) = 0.87, p = .36, η2 
= .016. This contrast is statistically equivalent to the non-significant two-way interaction of 
second prime valence and target valence with consistent first primes (see above). 
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In addition to affective priming effects, we also tested for non-evaluative priming effects 
of the two semantic categories implied by the employed stimuli (i.e., animate vs. inanimate). For 
this purpose, we first recoded the category of the first prime to reflect it’s (in)consistency with 
the category of the second prime. Response latencies were then submitted to a 2 (Second Prime 
Category: animate vs. inanimate) × 2 (First Prime Category: consistent vs. inconsistent with 
second prime category) × 2 (Target Category: animate vs. inanimate) ANOVA for repeated 
measures. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of the target category, indicating that 
participants were faster in responding to target words depicting inanimate objects (M = 617.44, 
SE = 6.90) as compared to target words depicting animate objects (M = 631.73, SE = 6.35), F(1, 
52) = 14.56, p < .001, η2 = .219. No other main or interaction reached statistical significance.  
Discussion 
Results from Experiment 1 indicate that affective priming effects were stronger when a 
given prime stimulus was preceded by an evaluative incongruent context prime than when it was 
preceded by an evaluatively congruent context prime. At first glance, these results may be 
interpreted as reflecting a general principle of automatic evaluations. Specifically, one could 
argue that affective responses are not determined by the absolute hedonic level of a given event 
or stimulus, but by the direction and size of change in the hedonic level (Brickman et al., 1978). 
As such, affective reactions to a given stimulus should be enhanced in a context of the opposite 
valence, but reduced in the context of the same valence. Alternatively, however, these results 
could also reflect method-related characteristics of the employed measure. Consistent with the 
finding that RI effects in Fazio et al.’s (1995) BFP depend on participants’ attention to the 
valence of the primes (e.g., Musch & Klauer, 2001; Simmons & Prentice, 2006; Spruyt et al., 
2007), evaluatively inconsistent context stimuli may increase the salience of the valence of a 
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given prime (see Cacioppo et al., 1993; Gawronski et al., 2005c), and hence the response 
tendency elicited by that prime. From this perspective, the obtained contrast effects may stem 
from a mechanism that is specific to the measure, namely attentional processes involved in RI 
tasks. Experiment 2 was designed to disentangle these two interpretations. If the obtained 
contrast effects are driven by construct-related principles of automatic evaluation, the same 
contrast effects should occur in affective priming measures that do not involve an RI component. 
If, however, the obtained contrast effects are driven by task-related RI mechanisms, these 
contrast effects should disappear—or even reverse—in affective priming measures that do not 
involve an RI component.  
Experiment 2 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to study affective priming effects resulting from two 
sequentially presented prime stimuli in an implicit measure that does not contain an RI 
component, namely Payne et al.’s (2005) AMP. For this purpose, Experiment 2 used exactly the 
same priming stimuli and presentation times as in Experiment 1. However, Experiment 2 
differed from Experiment 1 with respect to the focal task. Specifically, participants were 
presented with a neutral Chinese character immediately after the presentation of the two primes 
and their task was to indicate whether they perceived the Chinese character to be more pleasant 
or less pleasant than average. If the contextual contrast effect observed in Experiment 1 was due 
to context-induced changes in stimulus valence, a similar effect should be obtained with the 
AMP. If, however, contrast effects were driven by the operation of method-specific RI processes, 
these contrast effects should disappear in the AMP. To the contrary, given that misattribution 
processes are capable of integrating independent sources of affect (e.g., Murphy et al., 1995), the 
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two sequentially presented primes may even result in additive (rather than contrastive) effects in 
the AMP. 
Method 
 Participants and design. Forty University of Western Ontario undergraduates (30 female, 
10 male) participated in Experiment 2. All subjects received course credit for their participation. 
The experiment consisted of a 2 (First Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (First Prime 
Category: animate vs. inanimate) × 2 (Second Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Second 
Prime Category: animate vs. inanimate) within-subjects design. Due to a computer malfunction, 
data from one participant were only partially recorded, and were thus excluded from analyses. 
Materials and procedure. Prime stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1 (see 
Appendix). Two of the three subsets were randomly selected as first primes and second primes in 
the AMP. As target stimuli, we used 128 Chinese characters adapted from Payne et al. (2005). 
The procedure of the priming task was identical to Experiment 1, except for the presentation of 
the target stimuli and the required responses to these stimuli. Each trial began with the 
presentation of a blank screen for 700 ms, followed by a fixation cross (+) for 700 ms. The 
fixation cross was then replaced by the first prime for 133 ms, which was followed by the second 
prime for 133 ms. The second prime was then replaced by a blank screen for 34 ms, after which 
a neutral Chinese character was displayed for 100 ms. The Chinese character, was then replaced 
by a black-and-white pattern mask and participants had to indicate whether they considered the 
Chinese character to be more pleasant or less pleasant than the average Chinese character. 
Following the instructions employed by Payne et al. (2005), participants were told that the words 
can sometimes bias people’s responses to the Chinese characters, and that they should try their 
absolute best not to let the words bias their judgments of the Chinese characters. 
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Results 
To test the impact of evaluative context stimuli in the AMP, we first calculated the mean 
proportion of pleasant responses for each of the four prime combinations (i.e., positive-positive, 
negative-positive, positive-negative, negative-negative). Thus, higher values indicate a higher 
level of positivity in response to a given prime combination. Following the data analytic 
procedure employed in Experiment 1, we then recoded the manipulation of the first prime 
valence to reflect its evaluative (in)consistency with the valence of the second prime (see 
Gawronski et al., 2005b). The mean proportions of more pleasant responses were submitted to a 
2 (Second Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (First Prime Valence: consistent vs. 
inconsistent with second prime valence) ANOVA for repeated measures. This analysis revealed 
a main effect of the second prime, F(1, 39) = 27.03, p < .001, η2 = .409, indicating a higher 
proportion of more pleasant responses when the second prime was positive (M = .588, SE = .017) 
than when it was negative (M = .442, SE = .030). This main effect was qualified by a significant 
two-way interaction between first prime valence and second prime valence, F(1, 39) = 5.87, p = 
.02, η2 = .131 (see Figure 3), indicating that the affective priming effect of the second prime was 
more pronounced when the first prime was evaluatively consistent with the second prime than 
when the first prime was evaluatively inconsistent with the second prime. More precisely, when 
the first prime was evaluatively consistent with the second prime, participants showed a 
significantly higher proportion of more pleasant responses when the second prime was positive 
than when it was negative, F(1, 39) = 21.82, p < .001, η2 = .359. However, this effect was 
weaker, albeit still significant, when the first prime was inconsistent with the second prime, F(1, 
39) = 15.07, p < .001, η2 = .279.  
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In addition to affective priming effects, we also tested for non-evaluative priming effects 
of the two semantic categories implied by the employed stimuli (i.e., animate vs. inanimate). For 
this purpose, we recoded the category of the first prime to reflect its semantic (in)consistency 
with the category of the second prime. The proportions of more pleasant responses were then 
submitted to a 2 (Second Prime Category: animate vs. inanimate) × 2 (First Prime Category: 
consistent vs. inconsistent with second prime category) ANOVA for repeated measures. No main 
or interaction effect reached statistical significance. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 support the notion that experimentally induced variations in 
implicit measures can sometimes reflect task-specific rather than construct-specific effects. 
Although the prime and context stimuli were identical to those of Experiment 1, Experiment 2 
revealed a pattern of results that is in direct opposition to the one obtained in Experiment 1. 
Specifically, affective priming effects in Experiment 2 were stronger when the primes were 
presented in evaluatively congruent contexts than when they were presented in evaluatively 
incongruent contexts. In other words, the valence of the context and the valence of the prime had 
an additive effect on affective priming scores in Payne et al.’s (2005) AMP. These additive 
effects stand in contrast to the results of Experiment 1, in which we obtained contrast effects for 
Fazio et al.’s (1995) BFP. In that study, stronger priming effects were observed for evaluatively 
incongruent than evaluatively congruent contexts. Based on the aforementioned differences 
between the BFP and the AMP, we argue that the obtained dissociation has their roots in the 
presence versus absence of RI mechanisms. Evaluatively inconsistent primes presumably 
increase the salience of the valence of the second prime, and hence, prime-related response 
tendencies in the BFP. In contrast, the affect aroused by the primes that is misattributed to the 
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targets in the AMP presumably follows an additive function (Murphy et al., 1995), resulting in 
accentuated affect for evaluatively consistent primes and reduced affect for evaluatively 
inconsistent primes. 
Experiment 3 
Even though the results of Experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with our interpretation, one 
could still object that the contrast effect in the BFP may reflect a genuine characteristic of 
automatic evaluations that cannot be captured by the misattribution mechanism of the AMP. 
From this perspective, the obtained dissociation has to be attributed to a distorting effect on the 
task-specific mediator in the AMP (i.e., misattribution) rather than the BFP (i.e., response 
interference). To rule out this concern, Experiment 3 tested whether two sequential primes 
produce additive or contrastive effects under conditions of semantic instead of affective double 
priming. This question is based on previous research, showing additive effects in line with the 
principles of spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975) in a semantic priming task that used 
two sequential primes and a setup that does not involve RI (Balota & Paul, 1996). Hence, if the 
contrast effects observed in Experiment 1 were caused by construct-related features of affective 
processing rather than method-related factors pertaining to RI, they should turn into additive 
effects in a non-evaluative, semantic priming variant of the BFP. If, on the other hand, RI was 
the primary cause of contrast in Experiment 1, a non-evaluative, semantic variant of the BFP 
should produce the same contrast effects obtained in Experiment 1, despite earlier evidence for 
additive effects of two sequential primes in semantic priming tasks that do not involve RI (e.g., 
Balota & Paul, 1996).  
To test these alternatives, Experiment 3 used the same prime stimuli that were employed 
in Experiment 1, which varied in terms of evaluative (i.e., positive vs. negative) and semantic 
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(i.e., animate vs. inanimate) categories. In the present study, these stimuli were used in a 
semantic priming task similar to the BFP employed in Experiment 1, the only difference being 
that participants were now instructed to categorize the target words as depicting animate or 
inanimate objects rather than in terms of their valence (see De Houwer et al., 2002). Following 
the RI logic outlined for the BFP, we expected that a context prime of the opposite semantic 
category should increase the salience of the semantic category of the second prime, thereby 
increasing RI-related priming effects. Conversely, a context prime of the same semantic category 
should reduce the salience of the semantic category of the second prime, thereby reducing RI-
related priming effects. 
Method 
Participants and design. Eighty-eight University of Western Ontario undergraduates (49 
female, 39 male) participated in Experiment 3, receiving course credit for their participation. The 
experiment consisted of a 2 (First Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (First Prime 
Category: animate vs. inanimate) × 2 (Second Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Second 
Prime Category: animate vs. inanimate) × 2 (Target Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Target 
Category: animate vs. inanimate) within-subjects design.  
Materials and procedure. As prime stimuli, we used the same 15 words that have been 
used in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Appendix). Each set of word stimuli was divided into the same 
three subsets, resulting in three sets of five stimuli for each of the four stimulus categories (i.e., 
positive animate, negative animate, positive inanimate, negative inanimate). The particular 
position of each subset (i.e., first prime, second prime, target) was counterbalanced across 
participants. The procedure of the modified BFP in Experiment 3 was identical to the one in 
Experiment 1, the only exception being that participants in Experiment 1 made evaluative 
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decisions about the target stimuli, whereas participants in Experiment 3 categorized target words 
as either representing an animate or inanimate object. As with Experiments 1 and 2, each trial 
began with the presentation of a blank screen for 700 ms, followed by a fixation cross (+) for 700 
ms. The fixation cross was then replaced by the first prime for 133 ms, which was followed by 
the second prime for 133 ms. The second prime was then replaced by a blank screen for 34 ms, 
followed by the target stimulus. Participants were asked to indicate as quickly as possible 
whether the target word depicts an animate or an inanimate object (semantic decision task), using 
a right-hand key (5 of the number pad) for animate responses, and a left-hand key (A) for 
inanimate responses. They were also instructed to try not to be distracted by the primes. 
Results 
The data of Experiment 3 were aggregated according to the procedures described for 
Experiment 1. We discarded all latencies stemming from anticipations (RT < 300 ms; 0.6%) and 
incorrect responses (5.0 %). Following recommendations by Ratcliff (1993), all of the 
subsequent analyses were conducted twice: once with a predetermined cutoff-value (in this case 
1000 ms) and once with inverse-transformed latencies. The two data sets revealed corresponding 
patterns of results. For ease of interpretation, we report data with a cutoff of 1000 ms.  
To test the influence of semantic context stimuli in the BFP variant using a semantic 
decision task, we first recoded the category of the first prime to reflect its (in)consistency with 
the category of the second prime (see Gawronski et al., 2005b). Response latencies were then 
submitted to a 2 (Second Prime Category: animate vs. inanimate) × 2 (First Prime Category: 
consistent vs. inconsistent with second prime category) × 2 (Target Category: animate vs. 
inanimate) ANOVA for repeated measures. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
the target category, indicating that responses were faster to target words depicting animate 
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objects (M = 625.46, SE = 5.74) as compared to target words depicting inanimate objects (M = 
651.13, SE = 6.05), F(1, 87) = 54.12, p < .001, η2 = .383. This main effect was qualified by a 
significant two-way interaction between second prime category and target category, F(1, 87) = 
24.22, p < .001, η2 = .218, indicating a semantic priming effect of the second prime. Specifically, 
participants were faster in responding to animate targets when the second prime depicted an 
animate object (M = 619.73, SE = 6.03) than when it depicted an inanimate object (M = 631.19, 
SE = 5.79). In contrast, participants were faster in responding to inanimate targets when the 
second prime depicted an inanimate object (M = 646.21, SE = 6.57) than when it depicted an 
animate object (M = 656.05, SE = 5.90). More important to the present question, this interaction 
was qualified by a significant three-way interaction between first prime category, second prime 
category, and target category, F(1, 87) = 18.16, p < .001, η2 = .173 (see Table 2). To specify this 
interaction in terms of the present hypotheses, we conducted separate 2 (Second Prime Category) 
× 2 (Target Category) ANOVAs for the two context conditions. 
For semantically inconsistent context primes, analyses revealed a significant main effect 
of target category, F(1, 87) = 45.12, p < .001, η2 = .341, indicating that responses were faster to 
target words depicting animate objects (M = 627.48, SE = 6.21) as compared to target words 
depicting inanimate objects (M = 652.12, SE = 6.07). More important, the analysis revealed a 
significant two-way interaction of second prime category and target category, F(1, 87) = 36.97, p 
< .001, η2 = .298. Specifically, participants were faster in responding to animate objects when 
the second prime depicted an animate object than when it depicted an inanimate object, F(1, 87) 
= 27.31, p < .001, η2 = .239. Conversely, participants were faster in responding to inanimate 
objects when the second prime depicted an inanimate object than when it depicted an animate 
object, F(1, 87) = 14.00, p < .001, η2 = .139. The same analysis for evaluatively consistent 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
  When the Method Makes a Difference 26 
context primes revealed only a significant main effect of the target category, F(1, 87) = 31.85, p 
< .001, η2 = .268, again indicating that responses were faster to target words depicting animate 
objects (M = 623.44, SE = 5.80) as compared to target words depicting inanimate objects (M = 
650.14, SE = 6.39). The two-way interaction that would reflect a semantic priming effect of the 
second prime was far from statistical significance, F(1, 87) = 0.27, p = .61, η2 = .003. 
To facilitate comparisons with corresponding AMP scores in Experiment 4, we also 
calculated a priming index, reflecting the relative advantage of responding to words depicting 
animate objects over words depicting inanimate objects given a particular prime set. This index 
was calculated by subtracting the latencies of responses to animate targets from the latencies of 
responses to animate targets given a particular combination of first and second primes. Mean 
values of the priming index are printed in Figure 4. Replicating the pattern obtained for the BFP 
in Experiment 1, post-hoc comparisons revealed that the effect of the second prime category was 
significant in the context of semantically inconsistent first primes, F(1, 87) = 36.97, p < .001, η2 
= .298. This contrast is statistically equivalent to the two-way interaction of second prime 
category and target category with inconsistent first primes (see above). However, in the context 
of semantically consistent first primes, the effect of the second prime category was far from 
statistical significance, F(1, 87) = 0.27, p = .606, η2 = .003. This contrast is statistically 
equivalent to the non-significant two-way interaction of second prime category and target 
category with consistent first primes (see above). 
Corresponding to the analyses for Experiment 1, we also tested for affective priming 
effects resulting from the valence implied by the employed stimuli. For this purpose, we first 
recoded the valence of the first prime to reflect it’s (in)consistency with the valence of the 
second prime. Response latencies were then submitted to a 2 (Second Prime Valence: positive 
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vs. negative) × 2 (First Prime Valence: consistent vs. inconsistent with second prime valence) × 
2 (Target Category: positive vs. negative) ANOVA for repeated measures. This analysis revealed 
a significant main effect of target valence, indicating that participants were faster in responding 
to positive (M = 634.31, SE = 5.80) as compared to negative target words (M = 641.82, SE = 
5.68), F(1, 87) = 10.03, p = .002, η2 = .103. No other main or interaction reached statistical 
significance. 
Discussion 
Results from Experiment 3 further corroborate our assumption that experimental effects 
on implicit measures may sometimes reflect changes in the task-specific mediator rather than 
automatic evaluations. In the present study, we replicated the contextual contrast effects 
observed in Experiment 1 with a semantic variant of Fazio et al.’s (1995) BFP. This result 
indicates that contextual contrast effects in the BFP are not specific to automatic evaluations. 
Instead, such contrast effects generalize to non-evaluative variants of the same priming 
paradigm. In addition, the results of Experiments 1 and 3 provide further support for the 
previously obtained goal-dependency of priming effects in the BFP (e.g., De Houwer et al., 
2002; Klauer & Musch, 2002; Klinger et al., 2000). Particularly, we observed affective priming 
effects only when participants had the goal of categorizing the targets according to their valence 
(Experiment 1), but not when their goal was to categorize the targets in terms of a non-
evaluative, semantic category (Experiment 3). Likewise, we observed semantic priming effects 
only when participants had the goal of categorizing the targets in terms of the very semantic 
category (Experiment 3), but not when their goal was to categorize them according to their 
valence (Experiment 1). These results support the conclusion that priming effects in the BFP are 
primarily due to late, response-related processes, presumably tied to the preparation of a 
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response to the target stimulus (De Houwer et al., 2002; Klauer et al., 2005; Spruyt et al., 2007). 
At the same time, the present findings suggest that passive processes of spreading activation 
from primes to targets may play a less significant role, given that in the present set-up spreading 
activation should result in additive rather than contrastive effects of two sequentially presented 
primes (e.g., Balota & Paul, 1996).  
Experiment 4 
Even though the results of Experiment 3 are consistent with our assumption that contrast 
effects in the BFP are driven by method-related factors pertaining to RI, the alternative outcome 
of additive effects resulting from construct-related processes of spreading activation (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975) was based on research that used setups and materials that strongly deviated from 
the ones employed in the present studies (Balota & Paul, 1996). Thus, it seems important to 
replicate the additive effects obtained in earlier research for the current setup and materials. To 
address this concern, Experiment 4 tested whether the additive effects obtained for the AMP also 
generalize to non-affective materials. Paralleling our reasoning in Experiment 3, we 
hypothesized that the misattribution mechanism underlying the AMP is not specific to affect or 
evaluation. This assumption is derived from earlier research, showing that misattribution effects 
can also occur with non-evaluative qualities, such as cognitive feelings (e.g., Strack & Neumann, 
2000). To test this hypothesis, participants in Experiment 4 completed a task similar to the AMP 
employed in Experiment 2, using the same prime stimuli that were employed in the previous 
experiments. However, instead of judging the visual pleasantness of the Chinese characters, 
participants were asked to guess whether the Chinese character refers to an animate or an 
inanimate object. Based on the findings obtained in Experiment 2, we expected that two 
sequentially presented prime stimuli would influence guessing responses in an additive manner, 
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such that two animate (inanimate) primes should result in more animate (inanimate) 
interpretations of the Chinese characters than a combination of two semantically inconsistent 
primes.  
Method 
Participants and design. Thirty-eight University of Western Ontario undergraduates (27 
female, 11 male) participated in Experiment 4. All subjects received course credit for their 
participation. Experiment 4 consisted of a 2 (First Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 
(First Prime Category: animate vs. inanimate) × 2 (Second Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) 
× 2 (Second Prime Category: animate vs. inanimate) within-subjects design.  
Materials and procedure. Prime and target stimuli were identical to Experiment 2. The 
procedure of the modified AMP in Experiment 4 was also identical to the one in Experiment 2, 
the only exception being that participants in Experiment 4 were asked to guess whether the 
Chinese character depicts an animate or an inanimate object, using a right-hand key (5 of the 
number pad) for animate, and a left-hand key (A) for inanimate. As with Experiment 2, 
participants were told that the words can sometimes bias people’s responses to the Chinese 
characters, and that they should try their absolute best not to let the words bias their judgments of 
the Chinese characters (see Payne et al., 2005). 
Results 
Parallel to Experiment 2, we calculated the mean proportion of animate responses for 
each of the four prime combinations, with higher values indicating a higher level of animate 
guesses in response to a given prime combination. To test the influence of semantic context 
stimuli in the AMP variant using a semantic guessing task, we recoded the category of the first 
prime to reflect its semantic (in)consistency with the category of the second prime (see 
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Gawronski et al., 2005b). The mean proportions of animate responses were then submitted to a 2 
(Second Prime Category: animate vs. inanimate) × 2 (First Prime Category: consistent vs. 
inconsistent with second prime category) ANOVA for repeated measures, indicating a higher 
proportion of animate responses when the second prime word depicted an animate object (M = 
.570, SE = .026) than when it depicted an inanimate object (M = .393, SE = .022), F(1, 37) = 
26.72, p < .001, η2 = .419. This main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction 
between first and second prime, F(1, 37) = 14.47, p = .001, η2 = .281 (see Figure 5). Consistent 
with the present predictions, the semantic priming effect of the second prime was stronger when 
the first prime was semantically consistent with the second prime than when the first prime was 
semantically inconsistent with the second prime. More precisely, when the first prime was 
semantically consistent with the second prime, participants showed a significantly higher 
proportion of animate responses when the second prime word depicted an animate object than 
when it depicted an inanimate object, F(1, 37) = 28.16, p < .001, η2 = .432. However, this effect 
was much weaker, though still significant, when the first prime was inconsistent with the second 
prime, F(1, 37) = 9.08, p = .005, η2 = .197.  
In addition to goal-relevant priming effects of the animate-inanimate dimension, we also 
tested for goal-irrelevant priming effects of the valence of the employed stimuli. For this 
purpose, we recoded the valence of the first prime to reflect its evaluative (in)consistency with 
the valence of the second prime. The mean proportions of animate responses were then 
submitted to a 2 (Second Prime Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (First Prime Valence: 
consistent vs. inconsistent with second prime valence) ANOVA for repeated measures. 
Somewhat to our surprise, this ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of second prime 
valence, such that participants were more likely to guess animate when the second prime was 
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positive (M = .517, SE = .020) than when it was negative (M = .446, SE = .021), F(1, 37) = 
11.48, p = .002, η2 = .237. This main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction of 
first prime valence and second prime valence, indicating that this effect was statistically 
significant only when the first prime was evaluatively consistent with the second prime (Mpositive 
= .554, SEpositive = .028 vs. Mnegative = .427, SEnegative = .025), F(1, 37) = 11.81, p = .001, η2 = 
.242, but not when it was evaluatively inconsistent with the second prime (Mpositive = .479, 
SEpositive = .024 vs. Mnegative = .465, SEnegative = .020), F(1, 37) = 0.49, p = .49, η2 = .013. 
Discussion 
In combination with Experiment 3, the results from Experiment 4 further highlight the 
difference between priming tasks that do versus do not involve an RI component. In Experiment 
4, we replicated the previously obtained additive context effects for a semantic variant of Payne 
et al.’s (2005) AMP. This result stands in contrast to the findings of Experiment 3, which 
demonstrated contextual contrast effects for a semantic variant of Fazio et al.’s (1995) BFP. 
Moreover, the present findings indicate that the two kinds of context effects are not specific to 
measures of automatic evaluation. Instead, these context effects generalized to non-evaluative 
variants of the employed measures, providing further support for our assumption that 
experimentally induced changes may sometimes be driven by method-related rather than 
construct-related factors.  
Somewhat to our surprise, Experiment 4 also found a priming effect of prime valence on 
animate-inanimate guessing. Specifically, participants were more likely to guess animate when 
the second prime was positive than when it was negative. This effect was particularly 
pronounced in the context of evaluatively consistent stimuli, but disappeared for evaluatively 
inconsistent context stimuli. A possible interpretation for this unexpected finding is that positive 
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primes elicited a positive affective reaction, which then resulted in a general tendency to provide 
an affirmative response. Given that animate guesses resemble an affirmation response and 
inanimate guesses resemble a negation response, the valence of the primes could systematically 
influence non-evaluative guessing processes.4 This finding may indicate a potential problem with 
applying Payne et al.’s (2005) paradigm to non-evaluative dimensions. If non-evaluative 
responses to the neutral Chinese characters can be influenced by judgment-irrelevant features of 
the primes, the resulting priming scores could be systematically contaminated by contingent 
features of the employed prime stimuli. Future research should further investigate the range and 
potential limits of Payne et al.’s (2005) paradigm for non-evaluative dimensions. 
General Discussion 
The main goal of the present research was to show that experimentally induced variability 
in implicit measures may sometimes reflect secondary changes driven by task-specific mediators 
rather than genuine changes in automatic evaluations. Using double-priming effects as an 
example (Gawronski et al., 2005b), the present studies indicate that the same manipulation can 
even lead to opposite effects on otherwise similar measures, when these measures differ with 
regard to their underlying mechanisms. Across four studies, we found that multiple primes 
resulted in contrast effects in evaluative (Experiment 1) and semantic (Experiment 3) variants of 
Fazio et al.’s (1995) BFP. However, the same manipulation led to additive effects in evaluative 
(Experiment 2) and semantic (Experiment 4) variants of Payne et al.’s (2005) AMP. Drawing on 
earlier studies showing attentional influences on RI tasks (e.g., Besner & Stolz, 1999; Besner et 
al., 1997; Musch & Klauer, 2001; Simmons & Prentice, 2006; Spruyt et al., 2007; see also 
Proctor & Cho, 2006), we argue that these differences are driven by the operation of RI 
processes in the BFP, which are not present in the AMP. Specifically, we proposed that the 
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relative size of RI effects in the BFP depends on participants’ attention to the relevant feature of 
the prime (e.g., valence). To the degree that the salience of a given prime feature is increased in 
the context of a stimulus of the opposite feature (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1993), such context stimuli 
may enhance RI effects in the BFP via secondary attentional processes. This situation is different 
in the AMP, which has recently been shown to be immune against attentional influences 
(Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, & Deutsch, 2008b). Consistent with this claim, AMP scores in 
the present studies reflected additive context effects, as they are predicted by spreading 
activation models (Collins & Loftus, 1975) and as they have been shown in earlier research (e.g., 
Balota & Paul, 1996). Thus, interpreting contrast effects on BFP scores as reflecting genuine 
changes in automatic evaluations would have the potential to seriously distort theorizing about 
the nature of automatic evaluations. 
Understanding Contrast Effects in Sequential Priming 
Notwithstanding our interpretation of contextual contrast effects in terms of attentional 
accentuation, contrast effects in perception and judgment may arise from at least three other 
mechanisms, which can be described as (a) perceptual contrast, (b) correction contrast, and (c) 
comparison contrast (for reviews, see Suls & Wheeler, 2007; Wedell, Hicklin & Smarandescu, 
2007).  
According to the notion of perceptual contrast, the basic experience of a perceptual event is 
often biased in the direction opposite to the experiences that occur in temporal or spatial 
proximity (Wedell et al., 2007). For example, lukewarm water typically appears hot after having 
placed one’s hand in ice water, whereas the same water appears cold after holding one’s hand in 
hot water. Thus, in line with this emphasis on basic experiences, one could argue that the 
contrast effects obtained in the present studies resemble the notion of perceptual contrast, in that 
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automatic evaluations may be determined by the direction and size of change in hedonic 
experiences (Brickman et al., 1978), rather than by the absolute hedonic level of a given event or 
stimulus. However, in evaluating this interpretation, it is important to note that this mechanism 
predicts a genuine change in automatic evaluations (see Figure 1), and hence corresponding 
effects for the BFP and the AMP. This prediction stands in contrast to the present findings 
showing contrast effects for the BFP, but additive effects for the AMP. As such, perceptual 
contrast does not seem to represent a viable account for the present results.  
The second possible mechanism, correction contrast, implies that people try to correct their 
judgments for potentially biasing influences. For example, when evaluating the intellectual 
ability of a highly attractive person, evaluators may adjust their subjective assessment if they 
suspect that attractiveness may bias judgments of intelligence. Crucial for the present discussion, 
recent research suggests that such correction processes may be highly efficient, leading to 
correction for unwanted influences even in implicit measurement procedures such as priming 
paradigms (e.g., Glaser, 2007; Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Maier, Berner, Hau, & Pekrun, 2007). 
Could the contrast effects observed in the present experiments reflect participants’ efforts not to 
be influenced by the first primes? At first sight, this seems plausible given that participants in the 
BFP were potentially aware of a biasing influence, and given that the BFP, but not the AMP, 
emphasizes accurate responding. Both conditions have been shown to promote correction 
contrast in implicit measures (Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Maier et al., 2007; Maier, Berner, & 
Pekrun, 2003). Note, however, that this account fails to explain why participants did not correct 
for the biasing influence of the second prime in the BFP. It also cannot explain why studies that 
used only one instead of two primes failed to observe contrast effects for the same SOA of 300 
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ms (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans, Spruyt, & Eelen, 2003). Based on these considerations, 
correction contrast does not seem to provide a viable explanation for the present findings. 
The third mechanism, comparison contrast, operates when a stimulus is used as a standard 
of comparison for another stimulus (e.g., Mussweiler, 2003; Stapel, 2007). For example, a 
common criminal may be judged as being less evil when this person is compared to Adolf Hitler 
than when this criminal is compared to Mahatma Gandhi. In line with this reasoning, it seems 
possible that participants used the first prime as a standard of comparison for the second prime, 
which should accentuate the valence of the second prime if the first prime was evaluatively 
incongruent. However, as with the proposed explanation in terms of perceptual contrast, this 
account raises the question of why such comparison processes do not operate in the AMP, where 
two sequential primes showed additive effects. Hence, to maintain this alternative explanation in 
the light of the obtained dissociation, one would still have to draw on procedural differences 
between the two tasks. For example, based on Stapel’s (e.g., Stapel, 2007; Stapel & Koomen, 
2001) interpretation-comparison model one could argue that the evaluatively unambiguous 
targets in the BFP generally induce a comparative mindset, which has been shown to promote 
contrast effects. Conversely, the evaluatively ambiguous targets in the AMP may induce an 
interpretative mindset, thereby favoring assimilation. Note, however, that while this assumption 
bears some plausibility, one would also have to make the implausible and less parsimonious 
assumption that a comparative mindset in the BFP selectively triggers comparisons of multiple 
primes, but not comparisons between primes and targets. Otherwise, this explanation would 
(falsely) predict contrast effects of single primes presented at comparable SOAs. Thus, even 
comparison contrast does not seem to provide a viable explanation for the present findings. 
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Procedural Differences and Task-Specific Mediators 
In the present research, we predicted antagonistic effects for the BFP and the AMP based 
on the assumption that the BFP is primarily driven by RI, whereas the AMP is primarily driven 
by misattribution. Although the obtained results generally supported our predictions, it is still an 
open question which particular features of the two measures are ultimately responsible for the 
obtained dissociation. In the following sections, we discuss this question for the five most 
apparent procedural differences. Our central claim is that some of these features are essential for 
the proposed difference between RI and misattribution, and thus for the emergence of additive 
versus contrastive effects. Yet, other features may simply enhance or reduce basic priming 
effects driven by a given mediator, which may inherently enhance or reduce the respective type 
of context effect for each of the two measures. Finally, some features seem irrelevant for the 
proposed difference between RI and misattribution, and therefore should leave the obtained 
dissociation between BFP and AMP measures unaffected. 
The first difference is that the target stimuli in the AMP are of neutral valence and 
semantically meaningless for participants, whereas the targets in the BFP are of clear semantic 
and evaluative meaning. As we have argued in the introduction, the latter is essential for the 
operation of RI in the BFP, as otherwise there would be no target-related response tendency that 
could be congruent or incongruent with the response tendency elicited by the prime. At the same 
time, a lack of semantic and evaluative meaning seems crucial for misattribution to occur, as 
participants may otherwise base their judgments on response-relevant features of the target (e.g. 
Mayer & Merckelbach, 1999). As such, our account implies that using neutral target words in an 
otherwise unchanged BFP should yield the same additive effects that have been obtained for the 
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AMP. Conversely, using evaluatively meaningful targets in an otherwise unchanged AMP 
should result in the same contrast effects that have been obtained for the BFP. 
A second important difference is that participants in the BFP typically work under 
accuracy instructions, whereas no such instructions are given in the AMP. In fact, such 
instructions would make little sense in the AMP, as there is no accurate response defined for 
evaluatively neutral targets. In the BFP, accuracy instructions may undermine people’s 
propensity to use their affective states to categorize the target, which are subjective by definition, 
and therefore cannot be correct or incorrect. Based on these considerations, it seems possible that 
omitting accuracy instructions in an otherwise unchanged BFP may promote the emergence 
misattribution effects by the prime stimuli over and above the impact of RI. As such, contrast 
effects elicited by RI may be compensated by newly introduced additive effects resulting from 
misattribution, thereby leading to a reduction of contrast effects in the BFP when accuracy 
instructions are dropped. 
A third difference is that participants in the BFP are required to respond as quickly as 
possible, whereas no such speed instructions are given in the AMP. In the BFP, speed 
instructions may be important for the emergence of RI effects, given that the requirement to 
respond quickly may facilitate the creation of short-term stimulus-response associations. At the 
same time, speed instructions may promote quick and superficial processing of the neutral targets 
in the AMP, which may enhance the misattribution of prime characteristics to the targets. Based 
on these considerations, it seems possible that omitting speed instructions in the BFP may be 
detrimental to emergence of priming effects based on RI, and thus for contrast effects resulting 
from RI. To the degree that speed instructions enhance the misattribution of affective states to 
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neutral stimuli, including speed instructions in the AMP may increase basic priming effects in 
this task, and thereby additive effects of context primes.  
A fourth important difference is that the targets in the AMP are presented only briefly and 
are replaced by a masking stimulus, whereas the targets in the BFP typically remain on the 
screen until participants have made their decision. Even though we cannot think of any reason 
why a short and masked presentation of target stimuli may influence priming effects in the BFP, 
a limited opportunity for target processing may be crucial for misattribution effects in the AMP. 
Specifically, suboptimal processing conditions limit participants’ ability to base their judgments 
on particular features of the targets, which in turn may enhance their reliance on momentary 
feelings for evaluating the target stimuli. In other words, short and masked presentations of the 
target stimuli may not result in any changes in the BFP. However, longer, unmasked 
presentations may attenuate basic priming effects in the AMP, and thereby additive effects of 
two sequential primes (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993).  
A final difference we consider important is that the AMP is based on the proportion of 
positive versus negative evaluations of the target stimuli, whereas the BFP is typically based on 
the latencies of target evaluations. Still, affective priming effects in the BFP can also be 
manifested in proportions of positive versus negative responses, such as error rates for 
compatible versus incompatible trials when the task includes a response-window (e.g., Klauer, 
Rossnagel, & Musch, 1997). Thus, depending on the setup of the task (i.e., with or without 
response-window) priming effects in the BFP may be reflected either in response proportions or 
in response latencies. Given that the operation of RI should be unaffected by the inclusion of a 
response-window (Klinger et al., 2000), we would expect the same pattern of results for the BFP 
regardless of whether priming scores are derived from response proportions or response 
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latencies. Note, however, that this situation is different for the AMP, where analyzing response 
latencies as a function of the primes is generally uninformative about the emergence of priming 
effects. 
In summary, the above analysis suggests that several of the five major procedural 
differences may contribute to the functional differences between the AMP and the BFP, which in 
turn may influence the emergence of additive versus contrast effects of two sequential primes. 
One feature seems to set a necessary precondition for one or the other mediator: RI can occur 
only with clearly valenced targets, whereas misattribution can occur only with ambiguous 
targets. Over and above these necessary preconditions, three additional features seem to set 
facilitating conditions for one or the other mediator. First, dropping accuracy instructions from 
the BFP could introduce misattribution effects over and above RI, which may produce 
compensatory context effects (i.e., additive and contrastive) resulting from the two mechanisms. 
Second, speed instructions may be essential for the emergence of RI effects in the BFP and 
beneficial for misattribution effects in the AMP, which in both cases should increase the 
respective context effects (i.e., contrastive vs. additive) for each of the two measures. Third, 
short and masked presentations of the target stimuli may be essential for the misattribution of 
prime characteristics to the targets. As such, longer, unmasked presentations may reduce basic 
priming effects in the AMP, and therefore the emergence of additive context effects obtained for 
this measures. Finally, we could not find a theoretically sound reason why priming scores in the 
BFP should differ for response latencies and response proportions, which makes this particular 
feature irrelevant for the obtained contrast effects on BFP scores. In sum, although it is possible 
that one of these procedural differences is predominantly responsible for the obtained 
dissociation between the BFP and the AMP, we argue that the most critical feature is the 
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presence versus absence of a clear evaluative meaning of the target stimuli, which represents a 
precondition for each of the two mechanisms. Still, additional research would be useful to further 
clarify the individual role of the abovementioned features. 
Interpreting Experimental Effects on Implicit Measures 
The double-priming paradigm employed in the present research implies a deviation from 
the well-established procedures of the AMP and the BFP. Clearly, no scientist who is using these 
measures to assess spontaneous evaluations would introduce such changes. Nevertheless, the 
double-priming paradigm allows one to study the functional role of an important moderator, 
namely attention to features of the primes (see also Gawronski et al., 2008b). As this moderator 
is operating in many typical research settings, our conclusions have important implications for 
the interpretation of experimentally induced differences in implicit measures. Even though it 
seems reasonable to assume that many of these effects reflect genuine changes in automatic 
evaluations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), the present findings point to alternative 
explanations for at least some of these studies.  
One example concerns the nature of accessibility effects on implicit measure. Resembling 
the dissociation obtained in the present studies, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2005) showed that 
higher amounts of information intentionally retrieved from memory increase scores on implicit 
measures that do not involve an RI component, but decrease corresponding scores on implicit 
measures that do involve an RI component. Drawing on earlier research on ease-of-retrieval 
effects (Schwarz et al., 1991; for a review, see Schwarz, Bless, Wänke, & Winkielman, 2003), 
Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2005) argued that implicit measures involving an RI component 
are influenced by the experienced ease of retrieving information from memory, which typically 
increases as a function of the amount of information to be retrieved (Schwarz et al., 1991). In 
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contrast, implicit measures that do not involve an RI component seem to be influenced by the 
momentary activation level of associations in memory, directly reflecting the overall amount of 
retrieved information. However, even though these assumptions are consistent with the obtained 
dissociation, Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2005) data do not provide any information as to 
why different kinds implicit measures are differentially susceptible to the two kinds of 
influences. The present results suggest that attentional processes may play a significant role in 
this regard, such that the experienced ease of retrieving information from memory may influence 
attention to stimulus features in a manner that is opposite to the overall amount of information 
activated in memory. Thus, given that attention has been shown to influence implicit measures 
that involve an RI component (e.g., Gawronski et al., 2005b, 2008b; Musch & Klauer, 2001; 
Simmons & Prentice, 2006; Spruyt et al., 2007; see also Proctor & Cho, 2006), retrieval-related 
shifts in attention may influence these measures in a manner that is in direct opposition to 
retrieval-related effects on measures that do not involve an RI component. Future research 
employing supplementary measures of attention may help to clarify the role of attentional 
processes for ease-of-retrieval effects on implicit measures. 
Recommendations 
It is important to note that our considerations do not generally negate the validity of 
previously observed effects on implicit measures. However, they do suggest that caution should 
be taken when drawing inferences regarding changes in automatic evaluations. Given that 
experimental effects on task-specific mediators can distort theorizing about automatic 
evaluations if these effects are misinterpreted as reflecting genuine changes in evaluative 
responses, it is essential to distinguish between method-related and construct-related effects on 
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implicit measures. Based on the present research, we recommend supplementing research that 
aims at investigating experimental effects on implicit measures with the following components:  
First, research studying experimental effects on implicit measures should include a 
theoretical analysis of the task-specific mechanisms that translate automatic evaluations into task 
performance in the employed measure. Such an analysis will allow one to generate hypotheses 
about how a given factor may interact with method-related mechanisms. In the present studies, 
this analysis included earlier findings on attentional influences in RI tasks (e.g., Besner & Stolz, 
1999; Besner et al., 1997; Musch & Klauer, 2001; Simmons & Prentice, 2006; Spruyt et al., 
2007; see also Proctor & Cho, 2006) and the integration of multiple sources of affect in 
misattribution (e.g., Murphy et al., 1995). Of course, such analyses require a sufficient 
understanding of the task-specific mediators underlying implicit measures, and without such 
knowledge, it will be difficult to predict whether a given measure works “as intended” or will 
suffer from method-related distortions. To the degree that research on this question is still scarce 
(for valuable exceptions, see Brendl et al., 2001; Conrey et al., 2005; De Houwer, 2003b; Klauer 
& Musch, 2003; Rothermund & Wentura, 2004), the present findings point to the importance of 
more research in this regard. 
Second, it seems desirable to validate a given effect with two implicit measures that are 
presumably based on different mechanisms. For example, if a given manipulation shows 
identical effects on the BFP and the AMP—two measures that are based on very different 
mechanisms—the obtained correspondence would provide strong evidence for the method-
independent nature of these effects (e.g., Rydell & Gawronski, 2007). To be sure, many 
experimental effects have been demonstrated for different kinds of implicit measures. However, 
to our knowledge, there is only a single study (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2005) that compared 
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measures that do versus do not involve a RI mechanism. Interestingly, this study, just as the 
present ones, found antagonistic effects of the same experimental manipulation (i.e., ease-of-
retrieval task; see Schwarz et al., 1991). All other studies comparing context effects on different 
implicit measures used variants that were primarily based on RI, thereby limiting the 
diagnosticity of such comparisons (for an overview, see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). This 
predominant use of RI-based measures is not particularly surprising, given the small number of 
possible alternatives. As Gawronski et al. (in press) pointed out, only 3 out of 13 common 
implicit measures do not involve a notion of RI. Future research comparing experimental effects 
on measures that do versus do not involve a RI component may help to clarify the precise nature 
of previously obtained effects. 
Finally, as far as RI mechanisms are involved, special consideration should be devoted to 
attentional mechanisms and feature salience (see Gawronski et al., in press). These factors 
presumably play a crucial role in RI tasks, and are capable of influencing the intensity (e.g., 
Simmons & Prentice, 2006) or the direction of priming effects, as obtained in the present studies. 
Independent tests of feature salience (e.g., Rothermund & Wentura, 2004) could provide useful 
information in this regard. 
Conclusion 
Researchers often employ implicit measures as dependent variables to investigate 
processes of attitude formation and change. In such studies, experimentally induced differences 
are typically interpreted as reflecting change in automatic evaluations. The main goal of the 
present research was to show that experimentally induced differences in measurement scores 
may sometimes be driven by changes in the task-specific mediator underlying a given measure 
rather than genuine changes in automatic evaluations. In the present studies, such effects were 
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reflected in antagonistic effects of the same experimental manipulation on two functionally 
equivalent affective priming tasks that are based on distinct mechanisms (Fazio et al., 1995; 
Payne et al., 2005). As misinterpretations of secondary effects on task-specific mediators have 
the potential to seriously distort theorizing about attitudes and evaluations, researchers should be 
cautious in interpreting experimentally induced differences in measurement scores as reflecting 
genuine changes in the underlying evaluations.  
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Footnotes 
1
 Note that even though Fazio et al. (1995) used the term Bona Fide Pipeline in their 
original presentation of the task, they have rarely used this label since then (for a recent 
exception, see Olson & Fazio, 2003). In the present article, we use the shortcut BFP for the sake 
of simplicity to distinguish Fazio et al.’s (1995) task from Payne et al.’s (2005) Affect 
Misattribution Procedure (AMP). 
2
 The employed cut-off values of 300 and 1000 ms were based on the procedures 
employed by Gawronski et al. (2008a). 
3
 Note that responses to positive target words are typically faster than responses to 
negative words, thereby promoting scores higher than zero. Thus, the resulting priming scores 
should not be interpreted in an absolute manner, such that scores higher than zero would indicate 
a positive response and scores lower than zero would indicate a negative response. Instead, 
priming scores should only be interpreted in a relative manner, such that higher scores indicate 
more positive responses.  
4
 Note that the particular key assignment of animate-inanimate guessing was not 
counterbalanced in the present study. Thus, an alternative interpretation of prime valence effects 
on semantic guessing is that positivity could be inherently mapped to right-hand responses, such 
that positive affective reactions elicited by the primes enhance the likelihood of right-hand 
guessing. Future research may test these interpretations by orthogonally mapping affirmation 
versus negation responses with left-hand and right-hand responses in semantic guessing tasks.  
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Appendix: 
Word Stimuli Used for Experiments 1-4 
 Set A Set B Set C 
Positive Animate koala 
duckling 
butterfly 
kangaroo 
swan 
 
kitten 
panda 
bunny 
hamster 
seal 
 
puppy 
dolphin 
deer 
lamb 
parrot 
 
Positive Inanimate paradise 
summer 
sunrise 
relaxation 
vacation 
 
humor 
health 
cheer 
pleasure 
heaven 
 
harmony 
love 
freedom 
peace 
honesty 
 
Negative Animate cockroach 
grub 
germs 
mosquito 
snake 
 
maggot 
tarantula 
spider 
locust 
blackfly 
 
ticks 
hornet 
leech 
scorpion 
wasp 
 
Negative Inanimate disaster 
sickness 
vomit 
garbage 
accident 
abuse 
prison 
poison 
assault 
cancer 
terror 
murder 
evil 
death 
bomb 
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Table 1 
Mean Response Latencies in Milliseconds and Standard Errors as a Function of Second Prime 
Valence (Positive vs. Negative), First Prime Valence (Consistent vs. Inconsistent with First 
Prime), and Target Valence (Positive vs. Negative), Experiment 1. 
 
 First Prime 
Consistent with Second Prime 
First Prime 
Inconsistent with Second Prime 
 Second Prime 
Positive  
Second Prime 
Negative  
 Second Prime 
Positive  
Second Prime 
Negative  
Positive Target      
M 612 617  610 625 
SE 8.38 8.08  8.50 8.21 
Negative Target      
M 635 632  645 622 
SE 6.74 8.10  7.07 7.35 
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Table 2 
Mean Response Latencies in Milliseconds and Standard Errors as a Function of Second Prime 
Category (Animate vs. Inanimate), First Prime Category (Consistent vs. Inconsistent with First 
Prime), and Target Category (Animate vs. Inanimate), Experiment 3. 
 
 First Prime 
Consistent with Second Prime 
First Prime 
Inconsistent with Second Prime 
 Second Prime 
Animate  
Second Prime 
Inanimate 
 Second Prime 
Animate 
Second Prime 
Inanimate 
Animate Target      
M 626 628  613 634 
SE 6.67 6.53  6.31 5.95 
Inanimate Target      
M 653 652  659 641 
SE 6.38 6.49  6.30 7.39 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Hypothetical sequence of processes mediating between stimulus-presentation and task 
performance on an implicit measure of evaluation. Experimental manipulations may influence 
the measurement outcome via two routes: effects on evaluative responses (A) or effects on the 
task-specific mediator linking evaluative responses and task performance (B). 
Figure 2. Mean priming-index as a function of second prime valence (positive vs. negative) and 
first prime valence (consistent vs. inconsistent with second prime valence) in a sequential 
priming paradigm using an evaluative decision task (positive vs. negative), Experiment 1. Higher 
numbers indicate higher levels of “automatic positivity.” 
Figure 3. Mean proportion of “more pleasant” responses to neutral Chinese characters in the 
Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) as a function of second prime valence (positive vs. 
negative) and first prime valence (consistent vs. inconsistent with second prime valence), 
Experiment 2. Higher numbers indicate higher levels of “automatic positivity.” 
Figure 4. Mean priming-index as a function of second prime category (animate vs. inanimate) 
and first prime category (consistent vs. inconsistent with second prime category) in a sequential 
priming paradigm using a semantic decision task (animate vs. inanimate), Experiment 3. Higher 
numbers indicate higher levels “automatic activation” of the concept animate. 
Figure 5. Mean proportion of “animate” responses to neutral Chinese characters in the Affect 
Misattribution Procedure (AMP) as a function of second prime category (animate vs. inanimate) 
and first prime category (consistent vs. inconsistent with second prime category), Experiment 4. 
Higher numbers indicate higher levels “automatic activation” of the concept animate. 
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